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Abstract
Forecast improvements can be expected if the two partners involved in a brokerage merger
pool information and expertise. We examine four large mergers of brokerage firms in the last
decade to study the incidence of and explanations for forecast improvements after the mergers. At
the brokerage-level, we find that for two of the four mergers, forecast improvements appear more
pronounced in subsamples of stocks for which both of the pre-merger analysts were retained in
the merged brokerage. At the analyst-level, we find only weak evidence of forecast improvements
after the merger. However, we find evidence that after a merger, a stock is more likely to be
assigned to an analyst with overall better forecasting performance before the merger. This suggests
that analyst selection can be a mechanism generating the post-merger forecasting improvements.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, there have been a very large number of mergers in the
nancial sector. This merger wave can perhaps be attributed to two large shifts in
government policy during this period. First, starting in the mid-1980s, restrictions
on interstate banking were loosened, triggering a consolidation wave among former
state-level commercial banks. Then in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act took
effect and effectively repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, which for decades restricted
commercial banks from offering investment banking services, and vice versa.
Not only have the causes of mergers in the nancial sector been varied, so have
the effects of these mergers. Mergers are large complicated events, which affect the
merging rms in many aspects, including stock market valuations, hierarchical and
organizational structure, and leading to substantial employee turnover. However,
empirical work on the effects of these mergers have, for the most part, only focused
on the effects of mergers on stock market valuations of the merged entities, or on the
pricing of nancial products offered by the merging rms (such as loan or deposit
interest rates quoted by commercial banks).
A well-accepted view of nancial companies  whether commercial or invest-
ment banks, or insurance companies  is that they provide intermediation services
in markets in which there are information asymmetries between the suppliers and
demanders of credit (eg. Diamond (1984)). Given the importance of information
in the activities of nancial companies, it is surprising that little is known about the
informational effects of mergers among nancial companies at the empirical level.
In this paper, we seek to understand the informational effects of a merger be-
tween nancial rms by focusing on a specic service offered by nancial compa-
nies: earnings forecasting. We focus on one particular type of informational effect
of a merger, namely, the pooling of information and informational resources which,
prior to the merger, were privately owned by each of the merging rms. The fore-
casting enterprise is fundamentally information based. The accuracy of a particular
forecast depends on the resources that a brokerage rm devotes to collecting infor-
mation, and on the assigned analyst’s ability to synthesize that information. What
makes a forecast especially good or bad often depends on the access to and inter-
pretation of an analyst’s private information.
These features of the earnings forecast enterprise make it well-suited for inves-
tigating information pooling. Prior to the merger, each of the merging brokerages
would have assigned an analyst to cover a given stock, eg. Apple Inc. After the
merger, both of these analysts could potentially be retained in the merged broker-
age. By comparing the post- vs. pre-merger changes in forecast accuracy across
stocks for which both of the pre-merger analysts were retained, versus those for
which only one of the analysts was retained, we can measure the importance of in-
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formation pooling, which should only be present for those stocks where both of the
pre-merger analysts were retained. We also distinguish the effects of information
pooling from analyst selection, which is the possibility that better-abilitied analysts
are more likely to be retained following the merger.
Our empirical analysis is based on the comparison of the accuracy of earn-
ings forecasts before and after four large mergers of brokerage rms in the IBES
database. The IBES dataset contains detailed analyst-level information for each
forecast and allows us to track performance at the stock- and analyst-level, both be-
fore and after the merger, which is ideal for addressing the presence of information
pooling via the exercise described above.
At the brokerage-level, we nd some evidence consistent with information pool-
ing for two of the four mergers. For these two mergers, we nd that forecast im-
provements appear more pronounced in subsamples of stocks where information
pooling should be strongest. These subsamples include the stocks which were cov-
ered by both of the merging brokerages before the merger, as well as the stocks
where both of the pre-merger analysts were retained in the merged brokerage. This
evidence persists even after controlling for changes in the timing of forecast re-
leased after the mergers. These two mergers were also the ones where the merg-
ing rms were most equal in forecasting ability before the mergers, which perhaps
made information pooling more likely.
At the analyst-level, our evidence is more mixed. For one of the four merg-
ers, we nd that while the post-merger forecasts of analysts employed before the
merger at the acquired (target) brokerage benet from the presence of the analyst
who covered the same stock at the acquiring (bidder) brokerage, the bidder analysts
do not benet as much from having the target analysts around. For the other three
mergers, however, we have no robust evidence of information pooling.
Finally, we also consider whether the post-merger forecast improvements can
be attributed to analyst selection. We nd no evidence that better analysts are more
likely to be retained in the merged brokerage following the merger. This conrms
anecdotal evidence that in the wake of job uncertainty due to the mergers, many
of the best analysts at the merging rms were poached away by competing broker-
ages, so that the analysts remaining at the merged brokerage following the merger
are not the best analysts working at the two brokerages before the merger. How-
ever, in the cases where both of a stock’s pre-merger analysts were retained in the
merged brokerage, we nd strong evidence (for three of the four mergers), that the
stock is likely to be assigned after the merger to the analyst with the better overall
pre-merger forecasting performance. This suggests that analyst selection can be a
mechanism generating the post-merger forecasting improvements.
Two bodies of empirical work are related indirectly to this paper. First, a number
of papers have focused on the informational aspects of the earnings forecasting en-
2
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 60
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art60
terprise. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) focus on analysts’ career concerns and
the tendency towards herding, and Kandel and Pearson (1995) look for evidence
that competing analysts have differential interpretations of public information re-
garding a stock. Bernhardt and Kutsoati (1999) look for evidence in the data con-
sistent with a model in which analysts are compensated for the relative (rather than
absolute) accuracy of their forecasts. However, none of these papers have focused
on information pooling, which is the topic of this paper.
Second, there is a literature on measuring the effects on mergers among nan-
cial institutions, especially commercial banks (including Prager and Hannan (1993),
Sapienza (2002), Focarelli and Panetta (2003), Panetta, Schivardi, and Shum (2006),
Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool (2005)). All of these studies examine the effect of
mergers on the interest rates subsequently offered and charged by the merged banks.
Panetta, Schivardi, and Shum (2006) examined whether merging banks pooled in-
formation regarding borrowers which they had in common (before the merger) and
found no evidence for information pooling. To our knowledge, however, this is the
rst paper on mergers among nancial institutions which explores the micro-effects
of the mergers  in our case, the employment turnover caused by the mergers  on
earnings forecasts.
Finally, while there is a large theoretical literature in industrial organization on
information pooling (cf. Vives (1999), ch. 8), the empirical work on information
pooling has been limited. There are several studies of the effects of information
sharing within trade organizations. Genesove and Mullin (1999) presents a case
study of the sugar producers in the early part of the twentieth century, and Sny-
der and Doyle (1999) examined how automobile manufacturers’ announcements of
their future production plans in a prominent trade journal affected the manufactur-
ers’ actual production levels.
In the next section, we present a simple framework for looking at the effects
of information pooling. In Section 3, we introduce the data, and discuss the four
mergers which we focus on in this paper. Sections 4 and 5 contain the empirical
results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Information pooling, analyst selection, and forecast improvements
In this section, we explore the relationship between forecast improvements, and
how they can be explained by information pooling and analyst selection. We also
present several denitions of forecast improvements which we will use in our em-
pirical work. Hereafter, we will use the word rm to denote a brokerage rm,
which forms earnings forecasts, while reserving the word stock to denote publicly-
traded companies about which forecasts are being made.
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Consider two competing brokerage rms, j = 1, 2, who have assigned, respec-
tively, analysts A1 and A2 to forecast a variable vi, which is the quarterly earnings
per share of stock i. Prior to the merger, brokerage 1’s forecast of vi is xi,1, and bro-
kerage 2’s forecast of vi is xi,2.1 Let zi,j , j = 1, 2 denote the private information of
brokerage j, which is used to form brokerage j’s forecast xi,j using the forecasting
function hj(zi,j), j = 1, 2. The forecast is related to the true value by
h1(zi,1) = xi,1 = vi + ei,1
h2(zi,2) = xi,2 = vi + ei,2
where ei,1 and ei,2 are forecast errors. For simplicity, assume that xi,1 and xi,2 are
unbiased for vi, so the pre-merger mean squared forecast error is
MSEprei,j = σ2i,j = var(ei,j), j = 1, 2.
Now suppose a merger occurs between rms 1 and 2. Consider the case when
both analysts A1 and A2 continue to work at the merged brokerage. If zi,1 and zi,2
are still available, the post merger forecast is xposti = h(zi,1, zi,2) for some function
h(·), which is not necessarily the same as h1 or h2. Let MSEposti denote the post-
merger forecast error. We look for two types of forecasting improvements.
1. Brokerage-level improvements To dene brokerage-level improvements, we
need to compare the merged brokerage post-merger performance to a benchmark
for the two brokerages’ individuals performances before the merger. Given xprei,1 and
x
pre
i,2 , we use a benchmark equal to w1MSE(x
pre
i,1 ) + w2MSE(x
pre
i,2 ), a weighted av-
erage of the two brokerages’ individual pre-merger forecast accuracies, for weights
0 ≤ w1 ≤ 1 and w2 = 1− w1. Then brokerage-level improvements for stock i are
dened as the event that
∆MSEi = MSEposti −
[
w1MSEprei,1 + w2MSE
pre
i,2
]
≤ 0. (1)
In the empirical work, we will, for the most part, weigh the two brokerages’ pre-
merger forecast errors equally (ie. w1 = w2 = 12 ).
One premise of information pooling is that the merging brokerages share infor-
mation and expertise regarding stock i. Therefore, forecast improvements for stocks
which were not covered by both brokerages before the merger is not evidence of in-
formation pooling. Furthermore, to the extent that information and expertise is
1While the stock subscript i is not required for the discussion in this section, we include it to
facilitate comparison of the equations in this section with those in subsequent section, in which the
stock subscript will be important.
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analyst-specic, information pooling should imply that the improvements are more
prominent for stocks where both of the pre-merger analysts continued to work at
the merged brokerage following the merger. These considerations will guide our
empirical work below.
2. Analyst-level improvements While it is possible for both analysts to continue
forecasting stock i after the merger, it also seems reasonable for the merged bro-
kerage to consolidate resources and release one forecast instead. Provided that at
least one of the pre-merger analysts covering stock i in the two merging brokerages
continues to forecast stock i after the merger, we can also compare the forecast per-
formance of this analyst on stock i before and after the merger. For a stock which is
forecast by analyst j after the merger, we say that analyst j’s forecasting accuracy
of stock i improved relative to his pre-merger performance if
∆MSEi,j ≡ MSEposti,j − MSE
pre
i,j ≤ 0. (2)
The main difference between the analyst-level and brokerage-level forecast change
measures is that we can only compute the analyst-level change ∆MSEi,j if analyst
j covers the stocks both before and after the merger, but the brokerage-level change
∆MSEi can be computed even if the analyst who covers stock i after the merger
did not cover it before the merger.
Again, a precondition for information pooling is that the analyst chosen to pro-
duce the forecast after the merger has access to the skills, information, and exper-
tise of the analyst who covered stock i for the other brokerage prior to the merger.
For this reason, information pooling should imply that analyst-level forecasting im-
provements are more likely for those stocks where both of the pre-merger analysts
are retained in the merged brokerage. Of course, it will be rare for both pre-merger
analysts who covered stock i before the merger to be assigned to cover the same
stock after the merger. It is more likely that one analyst will be assigned to other
stocks. However, the mere presence of both analysts who had experience with stock
i in the merged brokerage means that the post-merger analyst has access to knowl-
edge and information about stock i not available before the merger.
To understand the way that information pooling leads to forecast improvements,
suppose for simplicity that the merger leads to a linear aggregation of information.
The pooled post-merger forecast is
x
post
i = ψ1h1(zi1) + ψ2h2(zi2) = ψ1x
pre
i1 + ψ2x
pre
i2 , 0 ≤ ψ1 ≤ 1 = 1− ψ2. (3)
The MSE (which is also the variance) of the post-merger forecast is
MSEposti = ψ21σ21 + ψ22σ22 + 2ψ1ψ2ρσ1σ2 (4)
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where ρ = Corr(e1, e2). For xed values of ψ1, and σ1, MSEposti is increasing
in ρ and σ2. Intuitively, under linear forecast aggregation, the primary benet of
information pooling is variance reduction. Forecast improvements are thus larger
when σ2 is smaller. Also, averaging the forecasts will lead to a larger reduction
in variance when the errors of the individual forecasts are negatively correlated
(ρ < 0) because the errors offset. This implies that the forecast improvements,
at both the brokerage and analyst-level, will depend on the relative ability of the
analysts involved and are more likely when ρ is small or negative. Indeed, for
some conguration of the parameters and depending on the benchmark, information
pooling may not even lead to better forecasts.
2.1 Analyst selection
Typically, mergers of nancial institutions lead to a great deal of employment turnover,
and the mergers studied in this paper are no exception. The possibility therefore
arises that forecasting improvements can also be due to analyst selection. Analyst
turnover following a merger can lead to two types of analyst selection. First, if
the analysts who remained in the merged rm were systematically better than those
who left, a brokerage-level improvement might result. Second, after a merger, the
better of the bidder and target analyst can be chosen to forecast a given stock.
In the context of the simple model from the previous section, analyst selection
amounts to letting ψ1 in Eq. (3) be a binary indicator chosen using the criterion
ψ1 =
{
1 if MSEprei,1 < MSE
pre
i,2
0 otherwise
so that the better analyst in the pre-merger period is chosen to cover each stock in
the post-merger period.
Observationally, both information pooling and analyst selection can appear very
similar, because both imply that post-merger forecasts should be more accurate than
pre-merger forecasts, and the second type of analyst selection implies that having
both of the pre-merger analysts around should lead to better post-merger forecasts,
because the rm is able to choose the better analyst to forecast the stock after the
merger. However, because our dataset contains detailed information on analyst
turnover and assignment to stocks, we can directly measure the importance of both
types of analyst selection after the mergers, and hence distinguish information pool-
ing from analyst selection.
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3 Data
Our dataset of analyst forecasts is derived from the IBES (Institutional Brokers
Estimate System) database, which is a comprehensive database containing every
forecast and forecast revision formed by analysts for a near-complete sample of
brokerage rms and securities. For a given stock (e.g. IBM) and forecast period
(a quarter, e.g. 92III), we observe every earnings per share (EPS) forecast and
revision which was submitted by analysts working at brokerage rms surveyed in
the dataset. The dataset contains forecasts from the beginning of 1983 to the middle
of 2002. In this paper, we focus only on quarterly EPS forecasts, since these are
the most common forecasts in the database.2 We also observe the actual realized
earnings for each stock in each quarter for which forecasts are available.
For the remainder of this paper, we refer to the acquiring brokerage as the bid-
der firm, and the acquired brokerage as the target firm. We use the terms bidder
analyst to refer to the analyst who covered a given stock at the bidder rm before
the merger, and target analyst to refer to the analyst who covered this stock at the
target rm before the merger. Finally, for a given stock i and analyst j, we use
the term rival analyst to denote the analyst covering stock i during the pre-merger
period at the brokerage other than the one where analyst j works. For example, for
a bidder analyst, her rival analyst is the analyst covering the same stock at the target
rm before the merger.
In the IBES dataset, we are able to track a particular analyst across different
employers. Particularly, for each stock covered by both the bidder and target rms
before the merger, we are able to tell whether the particular analyst who covered this
stock at the target rm remained employed at the bidder rm after the merger. This
will be a crucial component for our tests for the presence of information pooling.
3.1 Four mergers of brokerage firms
In order to identify mergers among brokerage rms in the IBES data, we used
the SDC Mergers and Acquisition database to obtain information on all mergers
within SIC four-digit sector 6311 (Investment and Commodity Firms, Dealers, and
Exchanges). From this list, we identied four sizable mergers among brokerage
rms. Since the number of mergers is small, we will do our analysis on a merger-
by-merger basis, and rely on the variation across time, across stocks, and across
analysts to identify the information pooling effects. The four mergers are listed in
Table 1. Generally, all four of these mergers represented attempts by the bidder
2The second-most common forecasts are annual earnings forecasts but, for a given year, they are
derived simply as the sum of the quarterly earnings forecasts for the four quarters which make up
that year
.
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Table 1: List of Mergers Used in the analysis
Merger A B C D
Bidder Brokerage Paine Weber Morgan Stanley Credit Suisse UBS Warburg
First Boston Dillon Read
Merger Date 12-94 05-97 11-00 11-00
Earliest EPS 2-10-82 5 19-82 7-13-81 4-18-84
Latest EPS 11-27-00 5-16-02 5-16-02 5-16-02
Target Brokerage Kidder Peabody Dean Witter Donaldson Lufkin Paine Webber
Reynolds and Jenrette
Earliest EPS 2-17-82 7-30-81 5-19-82 2-10-82
Latest EPS 12-19-94 4-28-97 10-10-00 11-27-00
Notes:
1. Earliest EPS is the date for which we have an earnings forecast from this brokerage firm.
2. Last EPS is the date for which we have an earnings forecast from this brokerage firm.
rms to expand the scope of their retail business by purchasing another brokerage.
Merger A, between Paine Webber and Kidder Peabody, was portrayed in the press
as a company in trouble deal, in which the second-tier brokerage (Paine Webber)
bought a top-tier investment bank with a strong research department (KP) at an
opportune time. Just prior to the merger, KP was reeling in the aftermath of a
trading scandal involving its chief government bond trader, Joseph Jett, and had
already laid off 10% of its workforce. Subsequently, KP’s owner, General Electric,
was looking to sell the company.
Merger B was another diversifying merger, in which high-end investment bank
Morgan-Stanley was portrayed as wanting to get in on the more down-market re-
tail brokerage operations of Dean Witter.3 As an indicator of the differences in
operations between the merging parties, we note that in 1996, the year before the
merger, Morgan-Stanley was the chief underwriter in 43 IPOs, with a combined
offer amount of over $7 billion, while Dean Witter underwrote only 4, with a com-
bined offer amount of just under $1 billion.4
Mergers C and D occurred only within a few months of each other, and both
were perceived to be attempts by Swiss banks to geographically diversify their lines
of business (into the American market). Merger C was a merger between two top-
of-the-line investment banks (CSFB and DLJ underwrote, respectively, 57 and 36
3For a time in the 1980s, Dean Witter operated service desks in Sears department stores.
4These figures, as well as those in the following paragraph, are drawn from
www.ipodata.com.
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Table 2: Analyst employment before and after mergers
Merger Pre-mergera Post-mergerb
Merger A:
Paine Webber 45 34
Kidder Peabody 54 9
New 13
Total 99 56
Merger B:
Morgan Stanley 77 69
Dean Witter 41 5
New 13
Total 118 102
Merger C:
CS-FB 130 104
DLJ 86 17
New 39
Total 216 160
Merger D:
UBS 98 71
Paine Webber 70 40
New 24
Total 168 135
aDefined as number of analysts who provided forecasts at brokerage within one year before the
merger
bDefined as number of analysts who provided forecasts at brokerage within one year after the
merger
IPOs in 1999), and concerns were raised about whether CSFB would be able to re-
tain many of DLJ’s brokers and analysts. Merger D was characterized similarly as a
geographically diversifying merger, with the difference being that both Paine Web-
ber’s and UBS’s American investment banking operations were smaller than those
of, respectively, DLJ and CSFB. A common effect of all four mergers is that they
precipitated a large degree of turnover. This turnover will be an important source
of variation for detecting information pooling, because an important exercise that
we do is to compare changes in forecast accuracy for stocks where both pre-merger
analyst were retained, versus stocks where only one (or none) of the pre-merger
analysts were retained. Table 2 shows the number of analysts employed by the
9
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merging units before and after their respective mergers varied substantially.5 After
all four mergers, the number of analysts grew in all four post-merger brokerages
(relative to the pre-merger number of analysts in the bidder rms). In percentage
terms, the larger increases in the number of analysts occurred after Merger B, where
the number of analysts increased by 32.5% (from 77 to 102 analysts), and Merger
D, where the increase was 37.8% (from 98 to 135).
The retainment percentages also depend on whether an analyst worked at the
bidder or target rm before the merger. Clearly, a higher percentage of analysts
from the bidder rm than target rm were retained. For Merger A, 34 out of 45
Paine Webber analysts were retained, but only 9 out of 54 Kidder-Peabody analysts.
This pattern holds across all four mergers. Indeed, only for Merger D were more
than half of the analysts from the target rm retained, while more than half of the
analysts from the bidder rm were retained in all four mergers. Furthermore, across
all the mergers, a substantial percentage of the post-merger analysts were new hires,
which make up from 20-25% of the post-merger analyst workforce.
Clearly, these four mergers feature very different brokerages, but we note that
the improvement of the research group was not a stated objective for merger in any
of these four mergers. Hence, it would not be surprising to nd that these merg-
ers had no substantial impact on forecast performance. However, if information
pooling is important, then these mergers may have provided opportunities for the
merged brokerage to experience incidental forecasting improvements via the shar-
ing of private information and expertise, even when these improvements were not a
fundamental reason for the mergers.
3.2 Measuring forecast accuracy
The main empirical exercise in this paper is to examine whether forecast accuracy
was improved in the merged brokerage following a merger. We utilize a standard-
ized forecast error,
FEijt =
fijt − ait
pit
(5)
where fijt denotes broker j’s forecast of the earnings per share (EPS) of stock i, for
the period t, and ait the actual realized EPS. For each stock i and quarter t, we only
consider analyst j’s nal forecast, and do not focus on the forecast revision process.
The error fijt−ait is standardized by dividing by pit, the price per share of stock
5Because analyst turnover is common without or without mergers, we look at analysts employed
at the brokerages in the year before the merger to isolate the turnover due to the mergers.
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i on the rst trading day of quarter t.6 FE, as dened in this way, can be positive
or negative, depending on whether or not fijt > ait. Additionally, we also follow
Lim (2001) by deleting observations when |fijt − ait| > 10, and also only consider
stocks i and quarters t where pit ≥ 1.7
Because FE can be both positive and negative, and it is still an open questions
as to the unbiasedness of analyst forecasts, it is not enough to compare averages of
FE across different time periods or stocks. Hence, we focus on the mean-squared
error (hereafter MSE) of FE.8
We focus on how the MSE’s changed across different stocks before and after the
merger. Accordingly, we calculate the MSE of FEijt for each stock i, brokerage j,
over a range of pre-merger and post-merger quarters. Specically, dene the pre-
and post-merger MSE for a given stock i and brokerage j as
MSEpreij = 106 ×
1
K
merg−1∑
t=merg−K
FE2ijt, j = bidder, target
MSEposti = 106 ×
1
K
merg+K∑
t=merg+1
FE2ijt,
(6)
where merg denotes the quarter of the merger. To ensure that we isolate the effects
of the mergers, we only consider forecasts within theK quarters before and after the
merger. In this paper, we use a valueK = 8 for our empirical results.9 Furthermore,
because earnings are dened on a per-share basis, the standardized forecast errors
are usually very small, so that we scale up by a factor of 106 in computing the MSE.
3.3 Summary statistics: all stocks
In Table 3, we present summary statistics of forecast accuracy for the four merg-
ers. For each merger, we report the median and mean, as well as the 10-th and
90-th quantiles, of MSEprei,bidder, MSE
pre
i,target, and MSE
post
i , across all stocks which
were forecast at least twice in the two years preceding the merger (for the pre-
merger MSE measures), and the stocks which were forecast at least twice following
the merger (for the post-merger MSE measure). First, note that the distribution of
6In normalizing by pit, we follow many of the empirical studies which utilize the IBES data,
including Rajan and Servaes (1997), Keane and Runkle (1998), and Lim (2001).
7The results are qualitatively robust to using alternative cutoff thresholds.
8Note that in the illustrative model if the previous section, forecasts are always unbiased, in
which case the MSE simplifies to the variance of FE.
9Some stocks i were not forecast by brokerage j in each of the K quarters before and after the
merger. In these cases, we compute the MSE as the average of the squared forecast errors only for
those quarters in which the stock was forecast.
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Table 3: Pre- and Post-Merger Mean-squared Errors in Merging Brokerages
(a) (b) (c)
Merger Statistic Pre-merger Post-merger
MSEprebidder MSE
pre
target (a)=(b)? MSEpost (c)=(a)? (c)=(b)?
A median 3.93 2.32 ** 4.11  **
mean 1873.8 1431.2 4808.3
10% 0.06 0.05 0.06
90% 262.47 164.01 235.59
#stocks 440 381 504
B median 5.03 2.43 *** 4.81  ***
mean 2259.7 317.1 2128.2
10% 0.05 0.07 0.10
90% 290.00 405.74 305.32
#stocks 852 418 764
C median 6.86 6.90  3.69 *** ***
mean 9173.1 2717.5 10207.6
10% 0.19 0.09 0.12
90% 538.54 497.98 309.43
#stocks 1238 749 967
D median 5.91 6.74  3.92 ** ***
mean 651.14 3706.2 462.69
10% 0.14 0.01 0.09
90% 302.89 640.03 210.98
#stocks 948 494 797
***: reject equality at 1%
**: reject equality at 5%
*: reject equality at 10%
MSE’s is highly skewed to the right. Across all the mergers, the mean MSE gen-
erally exceeds the 90-th quantile of the MSE distribution, both before and after the
merger. For this reason, in this paper, we employ median (quantile) regressions be-
cause, for such a skewed distribution, the median is a better measure of the central
tendency of the MSE distribution than the mean.
Table 3 shows that Mergers A and B were quite different from Mergers C and
D. In Mergers A and B, the target rms appeared to be better than the bidder rms,
in terms of median MSE before the merger. For Merger A, the median MSE for
target rm Kidder Peabody was 2.32, while for bidder rm Paine Webber it was
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3.93. Column 5 of Table 3 shows that these differences in medians were statistically
different from zero at a 5% signicance level. For these two mergers, however, the
post-merger median MSE was virtually the same as the median of the bidder rm’s
pre-merger MSE, and substantially higher than the target rm’s pre-merger MSE.
For example, the median MSE after Merger A was 4.11, which is just slightly higher
than Paine Webber’s pre-merger median of 3.93. Hence, for these two mergers, we
have evidence that worse-performing bidder rms acquired better-performing target
rms, and that forecasting accuracy actually deteriorated after the merger, relative
to the target rms’ pre-merger forecasting accuracy.10
The numbers for Mergers C and D tell a different story. The two mergers in-
volved partners which, in terms of their pre-merger forecast accuracy, were rough
equals. For example, the median pre-merger MSE’s for Credit SuisseFirst Boston
and Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette were, respectively, 6.86 and 6.90 (and statis-
tically not different from each other). However, there were clear improvements in
forecasting accuracy, as the post-merger median MSE in both of these mergers was
lower, and statistically different (at the 1% level) from the pre-merger median MSE
for both the bidder and target rms.
The simple model of forecasting improvements in the previous section assumes
that analysts’ forecasts are always unbiased, whereas the MSE (our measure of
forecast performance) summarizes both the bias and variance of the forecasts. In
Table 4, we report the bias and standard deviation of the forecast errors for each
merger, and also before and after the merger.
Across all the results, the magnitude of the standard deviation is much larger
than that of the bias. For example, for Merger A, the median pre-merger bias of the
forecast errors for the bidder brokerage is -0.0526, but the corresponding standard
deviation is 1.7728. Hence, even though the theoretical discussion in the previous
section assumed a model where analysts’ forecasts are unbiased, the results here
suggest that this may not be a bad approximation, because in the data the variance
component of the MLE far exceeds the bias component.
3.4 Summary statistics: affected stocks
An important subset of stocks which we focus on in this paper are those which were
covered by both the bidder and target rms prior to the merger, and continued to
be covered by the merged brokerage following the merger. This particular subset
of stocks will be referred to as the affected stocks in the rest of this paper. Com-
parisons of affected and non-affected stocks play an important role in our tests for
10This is somewhat surprising for Merger B, because the bidder firm in this merger (Morgan
Stanley) is widely considered a better research brokerage than the target firm in that merger (Dean
Witter).
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Table 4: Pre- and Post-Merger Mean-squared Errors in Merging Brokerages
Mean-squared errors broken down into Bias and Standard Deviation Components
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Merger Statistic Pre-merger Post-merger
Biasbid Stdevbid Biasbid Stdevbid Biasbid Stdevbid
A median -0.0526 1.7728 -0.0547 1.2589 -0.0507 1.8335
mean 3.5671 9.3330 3.0644 7.4749 4.7202 9.9199
#stocks 439 380 504
B median -0.0163 2.1013 -0.0435 1.3353 -0.0203 2.0598
mean 2.7800 9.6790 1.4225 4.7287 3.2028 9.6862
#stocks 852 418 764
C median -0.2681 2.3221 -0.0775 2.3132 -0.3311 1.7190
mean -0.8429 14.0994 2.1434 11.7908 -1.1986 12.5897
#stocks 1238 749 967
D median -0.1873 2.1069 -0.0326 2.4658 -0.2810 1.7178
mean 0.9947 8.3386 3.7317 12.7572 0.3163 20.7542
#stocks 948 494 797
information pooling.
In Table 5, we report the same statistics as in Table 3, but only for the affected
stocks. Across all four mergers, the bidder rm tends to produce more accurate
forecasts of the affected stocks than the target rm before the merger, even though
this difference is statistically signicant only for Mergers C and D. For Mergers
C and D, the median post-merger MSE is signicantly lower than the pre-merger
MSE for the target rm. For Merger B, the evidence here indicates a deterioration
in forecast accuracy, relative to the pre-merger performance of both bidder and tar-
get rms. For Merger A, we nd no evidence of changes in forecasting accuracy
after the merger. These numbers seem to suggest that brokerage-level forecast im-
provements are driven by the pre-merger forecast performance of the bidder rm.
Specically, if the bidder and target rms are roughly equal-abilitied before the
merger, then forecast improvements obtain; if the bidder rm is worse than the
target rm, then there are no forecasting improvements.
4 Empirical results
In this section, we examine whether the changes in forecasting accuracy docu-
mented in Tables (3) and (5) can be attributed to information pooling by seeing
whether forecast improvements appear more pronounced in subsamples of stocks
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Table 5: Mean Squared Errors of Forecasts: Affected Stocks
(a) (b) (c)
Merger Statistic Pre-merger Post-merger
MSEpre
bidder
MSEpretarget (a)=(b)? MSEpost (c)=(a)? (c)=(b)?
A median 0.89 1.00 – 1.29 – –
mean 45.81 139.50 129.35
10% 0.02 0.03 0.02
90% 32.46 74.37 53.17
#stocks 137
B median 0.79 1.30 – 3.25 *** **
mean 70.78 69.69 138.74
10% 0.01 0.02 0.05
90% 31.58 65.26 132.34
#stocks 197
C median 1.51 3.03 *** 1.76 – **
mean 154.62 338.78 1278.7
10% 0.04 0.05 0.08
90% 54.58 112.45 92.54
#stocks 383
D median 1.04 3.59 *** 1.78 – **
mean 27.10 83.64 172.52
10% 0.03 0.07 0.07
90% 45.29 166.79 144.71
#stocks 224
***: reject equality at 1%
**: reject equality at 5%
*: reject equality at 10%
where information pooling should be stronger, such as the affected stocks, and the
stocks for which both of the pre-merger analysts were retained in the merged bro-
kerage.
4.1 Brokerage-level forecast improvements
We start by documenting the brokerage-level forecast improvements. Dene
• AFFECTEDi = 1 if stock i was an affected stock and hence covered by both
the bidder and target rms prior to the merger.
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We also dene two more dummy variables to isolate subsamples of the affected
stocks where information pooling should be even stronger:
• BOTHSTAYi = 1 if both the analysts who covered stock i at the bidder and
target rms before the merger were retained in the merged brokerage.
• BOTHCOVERi=1 if both analysts cover stock i within two years after the
merger after the merger.
Note that the subsample of stocks with BOTHCOVERi = 1 is included in the
subsample with BOTHSTAYi = 1, which is in turn included in the subsample of
affected stocks (AFFECTEDi = 1).
Information pooling is fundamentally about the sharing of private information
and expertise, so that forecast improvements should be more prominent for the
affected stocks, when presumably both brokerages possess some information and
expertise. If the information or expertise required in the forecasting enterprise
is analyst-specic, then information pooling should be more pronounced when
BOTHSTAYi = 1. Information pooling should be even more pronounced when
BOTHCOVERi = 1, especially if information were very time-sensitive and changes
quickly, so that pooling occurs only when both analysts are still actively covering
the stock in the post-merger period.
In this section, brokerage-level forecast improvements are dened as
∆MSEi ≡


MSEposti − 12 [(MSE
pre
i,bidder + MSE
pre
i,target)] if AFFECTEDi = 1
MSEposti − MSE
pre
i,bidder if only bidder covers stock i
MSEposti − MSE
pre
i,target if only target covers stock i
with ∆MSEi < 0 indicating forecast improvements. Notably, ∆MSEi is dened
differently depending on whether stock i is an affected stock. This is because for
non-affected stocks, only one of the brokerages  usually the bidder rm  covers
the stock before the merger. For the affected stocks, our base case is to compare the
post-merger forecast to a equally weighted pre-merger forecast. Robustness to this
denition of forecast improvement will be considered below.
Under information pooling, ∆MSEi should be more negative when AFFECTEDi =
1 than when AFFECTEDi = 0, and even more negative when BOTHSTAYi = 1
and BOTHCOVERi = 1. Some insight can be obtained from Figure (1), which
presents the empirical cumulative distribution functions of ∆MSEi, for the various
subsamples of interest. Across all the mergers, the CDF for AFFECTEDi = 1 (in
the solid lines) tends to lie above and to the left of the CDF for the AFFECTEDi = 0
subsample of stocks (in the dashed lines), especially for values of ∆MSE greater
than zero. This suggests that the values of ∆MSEi are smaller (in a distributional
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Figure 1: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions for Brokerage-level Fore-
cast Improvements
X-Axis: ∆MSEi = MSEposti − (0.5 ∗ MSE
pre
i,bid + 0.5 ∗ MSE
pre
i,tar)
Y-Axis: empirical cumulative distribution function
Solid line: stocks for which AFFECTEDi = 0
Dashed line: stocks for which AFFECTEDi = 1
Dotted line: stocks for which AFFECTEDi = 1 and BOTHSTAYi = 1
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sense) when both brokerages forecast the stock before the merger, which is consis-
tent with information pooling. Conditional on AFFECTEDi = 1, we then single
out those stocks with BOTHSTAYi = 1. The empirical CDF’s for this subsample
shows that while the differences are not as sharp as between the AFFECTEDi = 0
and AFFECTEDi = 1, in all four mergers, there are substantial ranges of quantiles
where the dotted CDF lies above and to the left of the other two CDFs. This sug-
gests that forecast improvements are larger when AFFECTEDi = 1 and even larger
when both AFFECTED= 1 and BOTHSTAY= 1.
To provide a more formal analysis, consider LAD (least absolute deviation)
estimation of the model:11
∆MSEi = α+ β · AFFECTEDi + γ · Zi + errori (7)
where a negative β would be consistent with information pooling. The results from
this regression are reported in Columns A1, B1, C1, and D1 of Table 6. Since each
observation in this regression is a stock, we also include stock-level covariates Zi to
control for additional variation across observations. In the reported specications,
these covariates are AVGMCAPi and SDEVMCAPi which measure, respectively,
the average and standard deviation of market capitalization of stock i during the
eight quarters preceding each of the four mergers studied in this paper. We use
AVGMCAPi to proxy for stock i’s size, and SDEVMCAPi to measure its volatil-
ity.12
The existing literature on analyst forecasts (eg. Zitzewitz (2001), Gallo, Granger,
and Joon (2002)) has stressed the relationship between forecast timing and accu-
racy. Particularly, later forecasts are usually more accurate because they contain
the information revealed in earlier forecasts, so that forecast improvements after
the merger could arise simply from the merged rm choosing to release forecasts
later, and not from information pooling. To control for this possibility, we create a
stock-level variable, DIFFTIMINGi, dened as
DIFFTIMINGi =Avg(Days bef EOQ)posti
− [
1
2
Avg(Days bef EOQ)pre,bidi +
1
2
Avg(Days bef EOQ)pre,targi ]
(8)
where Avg(Days bef EOQ)i is the average number of days before the end-of-quarter
for which a forecast for stock i was released. DIFFTIMINGi measures changes in
11As we remarked before, we employ LAD regressions here because the results appeared very
sensitive to outliers in OLS regressions.
12In other specifications (not reported for brevity), we have used shares outstanding, and pre-
merger share prices as covariates. The results reported here are robust.
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Table 6: Brokerage-level Forecast Improvements
Results from median (quantile) regression; Dependent variable: ∆MSEi
Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
(A1) (A2) (A3) (B1) (B2) (B3) (C1) (C2) (C3) (D1) (D2) (D3)
Variable Est Est Est Est Est Est Est Est Est Est Est Est
(Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder)
AFFECTED -0.0632 -0.0533 —a -0.1296 -0.1702 —a -1.9489*** -1.9861*** -1.9211*** -1.0251*** -0.3195 -0.3195
0.1169 0.1284 0.4938 0.4920 0.4233 0.3754 0.3678 0.3377 0.2455 0.3982
BOTHSTAY -0.2943 0.6485 0.2022 0.6836 -1.5029*** -2.4190***
0.2373 1.1351 0.6345 0.9391 0.5683 0.5454
BOTHCOVER -6.3008*** 0.9161
2.2577 0.9825
Stock controls:
DIFFTIMING 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0117*** 0.0116*** 0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0209*** 0.0147*** 0.0151*** -0.0151***
0.0009 0.0009 0.0032 0.0031 0.0036 0.0032 0.0031 0.0028 0.0032 0.0028
CONSTANT -0.0262 -0.0262 0.7270** 0.7218** 1.5552*** 1.5525*** 1.4767*** 0.2819 0.2727 0.2727
0.0671 0.0680 0.2974 0.2888 0.3043 0.2637 0.2589 0.2208 0.2503 0.2240
N 407 407 407 561 561 561 744 744 744 539 539 539
med(∆MSEi) -0.0126 0.4747 0.0148 -0.1550
med(DIFFTIMING) 5.4 28.9 -24.5 -28.4
#(AFFECTED=1) 137 197 383 224
#(BOTHSTAY=1) 25 21 31 87
#(BOTHCOVER=1) 2 1 4 17
***: statistically significant at 1%; **: statistically significant at 5%; *: statistically significant at 10%
Coefficients for stock-level controls AVGMCAP and SDEVMCAP are not reported for convenience.
a: Results were not reliable, due to small number of observations with BOTHCOV ER = 1.
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forecast timing after the merger, with positive values indicating that forecasts were
released earlier, on average, after the merger. Since more negative values of the LHS
variable ∆MSEi indicate more forecast improvements, we expect the regression
coefcient on DIFFTIMING to be positive, implying that earlier forecasts lead to
less forecast improvements after the merger.
For Mergers C and D, the coefcient on AFFECTED is negative and signicant
(the coefcients are, respectively, -1.9489 and -1.0251). Moreover, the magnitudes
of these coefcients are economically nontrivial, in that they are large in comparison
to the magnitudes of the unconditional median of the dependent variable, reported
at the bottom of the table. Hence, for these two mergers, the regression results
conrm the graphical evidence from Figure (1) that information pooling might be
present.
Among the stock-level controls, the coefcient on DIFFTIMING is positive
and signicant across all four mergers, and all specications of the regression. This
is in the expected direction, and indicates that for stocks where the forecast was
released sooner following the merger, the forecast improvements were smaller. At
the bottom of the table, we present the unconditional median of the DIFFTIMING
variable across the four mergers, which shows that forecasts tended to be released
sooner after Mergers A and B, but later following Mergers C and D.
Next, we narrow our focus to smaller subsets of stocks for which information
pooling should be stronger. In Columns A2, B2, C2, and D2 of Table 6, we report
results for the regression when BOTHSTAY is added as a right-hand side variable.
Only for Merger D is the coefcient on BOTHSTAYi negative and signicant (and
equal to -1.5029), indicating larger forecasting improvements for the stocks for
which both pre-merger analysts were retained. This is evidence of a stronger notion
of information pooling.13
Finally, we further narrow the analysis to those stocks where both analysts con-
tinue to produce forecasts in the post-merger period. The results from the regres-
sion with the BOTHCOVERi dummy included are reported in Columns C3 and
D3 of Table 6 (we were only able to run this regression for Mergers C and D, but
to the small number of observations where BOTHCOVERi=1). The coefcient on
BOTHCOVERi is negative and signicant only for Merger C, but not in Merger D.
Hence, for Mergers C and D, we obtain evidence indicating that a stronger notion of
information pooling (as captured by the negative coefcients on either the BOTH-
13The finding that information pooling is more prominent when both of the pre-merger analysts
were retained also provides support against an alternative explanation for improved analyst per-
formance following a merger, namely that retained analysts may work harder following a merger
because of increased job security concerns following the merger. This alternative story does not
provide an explanation for why a retained analyst’s performance improves more after the merger
when her former rival is also retained.
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STAY or BOTHCOVER variables) may be an explanation for the post-merger fore-
cast improvements. From Table 3, we see that these two mergers were the ones
where the merging rms were most equal in forecasting ability before the mergers,
which perhaps made information pooling more likely.
4.1.1 Robustness
One worry with the above regressions is that the changes in forecasting accuracy
after the merger could simply reect changes in forecasting accuracy around the
time of the mergers due, for instance, to unanticipated business-cycle movements,
but not directly related to the mergers. As a robustness check, we expand the sam-
ple to include the changes in MSE’s for brokerages which did not participate in any
merger, as a control group. The idea is that any time-specic factors affecting fore-
casting accuracy should impact on both the merging and non-merging brokerages,
whereas the effects of the merger (such as information pooling) should predomi-
nantly affect the merging brokerages only. The modied regression is
∆MSEi,k =α + α1 · MERGEk + β · AFFECTEDi + β1 · AFFECTEDi ∗ MERGEk
+ γ · BOTHSTAYi + γ1 · BOTHSTAYi ∗ MERGEk + αZi + errori,k
(9)
where the k subscript denotes different brokerage rms, and MERGEi is a binary
indicator for whether brokerage k is the merged brokerage. The sample includes all
brokerages k and stocks i for which forecasts were submitted for at least two quar-
ters before and after the merger. The main benet from including the observations
from the non-merging rms is that we can estimate the coefcient on MERGEi,
which measures the part of the forecasting changes due specically to the mergers,
and not due to changes across time in forecasting abilities which are common across
all brokerages. The interaction of AFFECTED and BOTHSTAY with MERGE are
now used to capture the incremental effects of the AFFECTED and BOTHSTAY
indicators on the forecasting changes of the merged brokerage. A nding that β1
and β2 is negative would suggest that forecast improvements result from the merger,
and are not due to time specic effects.14
The results are reported in Table (7). The coefcient on the interaction terms
are negative and signicant in most of the regressions, the sole exception being the
negative but insignicant coefcient on AFFECTED*MERGE in Merger D. This
furnishes strong evidence that the mergers had distinctive effects on the forecast-
ing performance of the merged brokerage, relative to others non-merging broker-
ages. Moreover, comparing these results with the corresponding results in Table
14In these regressions, BOTHSTAY and MERGE are always equal to zero for the observations of
the non-merging firms.
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Table 7: Brokerage-level Forecast Improvements: Including Observations from
Non-merging Brokerages
Results from median (quantile) regression; Dependent variable: ∆MSEi
Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
Variable Est Est Est Est
(Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder)
MERGE 0.5025*** 0.1583 0.2844 -0.1946
0.0500 0.1823 0.2936 0.3020
AFFECTED -0.0741*** -0.2453*** -0.3296*** 0.1059**
0.0208 0.0618 0.0630 0.0525
AFFECTED*MERGE -0.5257*** -0.0214*** -0.6999** -0.1543
0.0790 0.2506 0.3245 0.3356
BOTHSTAY 0.3633*** 2.8797*** 0.2855*** 0.0467
0.0422 0.1393 0.1479 0.1646
BOTHSTAY*MERGE -0.6916*** -12.5833*** -12.8695*** -3.3433***
0.1511 0.5213 0.4813 0.5436
Stock controls:
DIFFTIMING 0.0017 0.0073*** 0.0058*** 0.0047***
0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
CONSTANT 0.0426*** 0.4863*** 0.5847*** 0.1816***
0.0132 0.0412 0.0508 0.0388
N 5908 5312 4219 4149
***: statistically significant at 1%; **: statistically significant at 5%; *: statistically
significant at 10%
Coefficients for stock-level controls AVGMCAP and SDEVMCAP are not reported for
convenience.
(6), the most striking change is that the effect of BOTHSTAY on the merged bro-
kerage (which is equal to the sum of the coefcients on BOTHSTAY and BOTH-
STAY*MERGE) is now more negative, and signicant, across all four mergers.15
Thus, these results demonstrate even clearer evidence of information pooling.
For the second set of specication checks, we consider alternative denitions of
15From inspections of the data, this appears to be driven by the fact that the average value of
∆MSE across all observations in this regression (from both the merging and non-merging firms) is
positive, indicating worsening forecasts. On the other hand, the values of ∆MSE in the merging
firms are, on average, either negative or slightly positive. Hence, compared with the overall sample,
the values of ∆MSE in the merging firms are smaller, which explains the negative and significant
coefficient on BOTHSTAY.
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the dependent variable ∆MSEi. Because improving forecast precision may not be
and is likely not the goal of the mergers, what is deemed an improvement from a sta-
tistical perspective need not be an improvement from the brokerages’ perspectives.
In the regressions in Table (6), we measured brokerage-level forecast improvement
as the difference between the post-merger MSE and the simple average (ie. taking
w1 = w2 =
1
2
in Eq. (1) of the pre-merger MSEs of the bidder and the target rm.
This was used because simple averaging favors neither the bidder nor the target
rm, nor does not it weigh the better performing brokerage pre-merger more or less
than the weaker brokerage.16
Nevertheless, to assess the robustness of the results, we re-ran the regression
(7) for alternative values of the weights w1 and w2, including the special cases of
putting all the weight on the bidder rm and none on the target rm, and vice versa.
The robustness check consists of reconsidering the brokerage-level regressions re-
ported in Table (6) for alternative denitions of ∆MSEi. We do not report the results
for the sake of brevity, but summarize them here. The regression results are similar
to those reported in Table (6) when we put larger weight on the pre-merger MSE of
the target rm. It is only when we put increasingly heavy weights on the MSE of the
bidder rm that the negative coefcients on AFFECTED and BOTHSTAY become
less signicant.17 For Mergers A and C, however, we nd that the results reported
in Table (6) are robust across a wide range of alternative weighting schemes. Over-
all, we nd that although the results are not uniform over all alternatives values of
w1 and w2, the evidence for information pooling at the brokerage level occurring in
the form of forecast improvements holds up for most values of the weights.
4.2 Analyst-level forecast improvements
While the evidence above suggests that brokerage-level forecast improvements oc-
curred after three of the four mergers, we do not know if these improvements extend
to the analyst level. Indeed, the benets of information pooling may be larger at the
analyst level especially for the analysts who were substandard prior to the mergers.
To focus on analyst-level forecast changes, dene
∆MSEi,j ≡ MSEposti,j − MSE
pre
i,j
as a measure of the change in analyst j’s forecast accuracy for stock i. Again,
∆MSEi,j < 0 indicates forecast improvements.
16Furthermore, the forecast combination literature finds that simple averaging often outperforms
more sophisticated forms of averaging. See, for example, Timmermann (2005). Thus in a sense,
simple averaging forms a harder to beat benchmark.
17However, the results reported in Table (6) are robust even when we set w1 = 0.85, where w1
denotes the weight on the bidder firm’s MSE in the pre-merger benchmark.
23
Ng and Shum: Detecting Information Pooling
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
In order to measure analyst-level forecasting changes, we have to restrict our
sample to stocks which were covered, in the post-merger period, by either the bidder
or target analyst. Let j denote the analyst who covers stock i after the merger. As in
the previous section, we dene dummy variables which indicate subsets of stocks
where information pooling should be strongest. We now dene
• RIVALSTAYi,j = 1 if analyst j’s former rival (ie. the analyst who covered
stock i in the other brokerage before the merger) was retained in the merged
brokerage.
The dummy variable equals one in two circumstances. First, if analyst j, covering
stock i, worked at the bidder rm before the merger, then RIVALSTAYij = 1 if
the analyst who covered stock i at the target rm before the merger was retained
at the merged brokerage after the merger. Second, if analyst j, covering stock i,
worked at the target rm before the merger, then RIVALSTAYij = 1 if the analyst
who covered stock i at the bidder rm before the merger was retained at the merged
brokerage after the merger.
Figure (2) plots the CDFs of ∆MSEi,j separately for RIVALSTAYi,j = 0 (in
solid lines) and RIVALSTAYi,j = 1 (in dashed lines). Compared to the brokerage-
level graphs in Figure 1, forecast improvements are less apparent here. For Mergers
A, B, and D, substantial portions of the RIVALSTAYi,j = 1 graphs lie to the right
of the RIVALSTAYi,j = 0 graphs, indicating a deterioration in forecasting accuracy
after the mergers. Only for Merger C is there evidence of forecast improvements.
Hence, from the graphs, the evidence for analyst-level forecast improvements is
more mixed, which is conrmed in regression results. We run the LAD regression
of:
∆MSEi,j = α + β · RIVALSTAYij + γZi + δWj + errori
separately for (i) the subsample of stocks covered in the post-merger period by the
bidder analyst, which we call the bidder stocks; and (ii) the subsample covered
by the target analyst, which we call the target stocks. A nding that β < 0 would
be consistent with the presence of information pooling.
In addition to the stock-level control variables Zi , we also include analyst-
specic covariates to control for possible analyst heterogeneity. These covariates
Wj are: (1) PREMSEj , analyst j’s pre-merger mean-squared forecast error, taken
across all the stocks covered by analyst j in the two years prior to the merger;
and (2) DIFFNUMj, the difference between the total number of stocks covered by
analyst j in the year after the merger, versus the year before the merger. The rst
covariate controls for analyst-specic forecasting ability, while the second covariate
controls for the attention that analyst j pays to each stock that she covers. Be-
cause of the small number of stocks where RIVALSTAY=1, only ve of the eight
regressions had reliable results, and are reported in Table 8.
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Figure 2: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions for Analyst-level Forecast
Improvements
X-Axis: ∆MSEi,j = MSEposti,j − MSE
pre
i,j , for stocks i and analyst j a
Y-Axis: empirical cumulative distribution function
Solid line: stocks i for which RIVALSTAYi,j = 0
Dashed line: stocks i for which RIVALSTAYi,j = 1
.
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a : j ∈ {bid, tar} denotes analyst who forecast stocks after the merger. That is, j = bid if stock
was forecast by bidder analyst after the merger, and j = tar if stock was forecast by target after the
merger.
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Table 8: Analyst-level forecast improvements
Results from median (quantile) regression; Dependent variable: ∆MSEi,j
Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
(A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2)
Bidder stocksa Target stocksb Bidder stocks Target stocks Bidder stocks Target stocks Bidder stocks Target stocks
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder)
RIVALSTAY —c -17.1619*** 0.5514 —c -0.7928 —c 0.2634 -9.3631***
6.1988 0.9530 1.2877 0.5882 2.6488
DIFFTIMING 0.0580 0.0145*** 0.0113* 0.0060* 0.0585***
0.0446 0.0034 0.0064 0.0035 0.0150
PREMSE -0.0180*** -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0015*** -0.092**
0.0037 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0036
DIFFNUM 2.8192*** -0.1250* 0.0854 -0.0274 -0.1013
0.3728 0.0667 0.1461 0.0810 0.1688
CONSTANT 17.5660*** 0.3992 1.0538*** 0.5067 1.7853
5.1054 0.2925 0.3790 0.2450 1.1748
N 222 60 330 22 292 75 187 166
med(∆MSEi) 0.0031 0.3911 0.3451 0.0360 0.3303 -0.0074 0.1472 -0.5195
med(DIFFTIMING) 19.6 -7.4 43.8 -67.4 -5.8 -41.2 -6.2 -32.0
#(RIVALSTAY=1) 3 24 16 1 19 4 27 18
***: statistically significant at 1%; **: statistically significant at *5%; *: statistically significant at 10%
Coefficients for stock-level controls AVGMCAP and SDEVMCAP are not reported for convenience.
a: stocks which were covered in post-merger period by analyst who worked at bidder brokerage before merger
b: stocks which were covered in post-merger period by analyst who worked at target brokerage before merger
c: There were not enough stocks with RIVALSTAY= 1 to obtain reliable estimates for this regression.
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For the bidder stocks, we nd no evidence for information pooling. For Mergers
B, C, and D, the coefcient on RIVALSTAY is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. For the target stocks, however, there is some evidence of information pooling.
For the two mergers where we had enough data to run this regression, we nd a
negative and signicant coefcient on RIVALSTAY: -17.16 for Merger A, and -
9.36 for Merger D. These results suggest that information pooling occurs primarily
for the target analysts covering a stock in the merged brokerage when the bidder
analyst is also retained, but assigned to other stocks.
For the other control variables, we nd that the coefcient on the timing vari-
able DIFFTIMING continues to be positive, and signicant in four of the ve re-
gressions.
4.2.1 Robustness and additional results
As with the brokerage-level regressions, we also considered analyst-level regres-
sions (analogous to Eq. (7) that include the changes in MSE of the non-merging
brokerages as a control group in the sample, to isolate the effects due specically to
the mergers. because the results in Table 8 The regression is
∆MSEi,j =α + α1 · MERGEj + β · RIVALSTAYi + β1 · RIVALSTAYi ∗ MERGEj
+ γZi + δWj + errori,j
(10)
where the j subscript denote different analysts, and MERGEj is a binary indicator
for whether analyst j works at the merged brokerage after the merger. A nding
that β1 is negative would suggest that there are changes in forecasting accuracy due
to the merger, and not just to time effects. 18 Table (9) report the results, sepa-
rately for the subsamples of bidder and target stocks in each merger. The results
weaken the earlier results in Table 8. For the target stocks, the coefcient RIVAL-
STAY*MERGE remains negative and signicant for Merger D, but no longer for
Merger A. For the bidder stocks, the coefcient on this interaction continues to be
small and insignicant. This regression shows that only for Merger D do we have
robust evidence of information pooling, and only for the target stocks.
As our strongest test of information pooling, we also investigate an implication
of information pooling motivated in section 2, whereby post-merger forecast im-
provements should be inversely related to the pre-merger correlation in the forecast
errors of the analysts. Let ρi be the correlation between the errors in the bidder and
target rms’ pre-merger forecasts of stock i. In order to compute this correlation,
18In these regressions, RIVALSTAY and MERGE are always equal to zero for the observations
of the non-merging firms.
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Table 9: Analyst-level forecast improvements: Including forecasts of analysts at non-merging brokerages
Results from median (quantile) regression; Dependent variable: ∆MSEi,j
Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
(A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) (D2)
Bidder stocksa Target stocksb Bidder stocks Target stocks Bidder stocks Target stocks Bidder stocks Target stocks
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder)
MERGE —c -1.5495 0.1102 —c -0.1462 —c 0.0454 -0.1107
3.2081 0.1387 0.1769 0.2209 0.3168
RIVALSTAY 0.5547 -0.0427 -0.5051*** -0.3079*** 0.0124
1.6502 0.1041 0.1321 0.0975 0.1368
RIVALSTAY*MERGE 1.3354 -0.5257 0.2274 0.3834 -2.5030***
3.8299 0.3885 0.5127 0.3995 0.4296
PREMSE -0.0020** 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DIFFNUM -0.2229 -0.0151 -0.0110 -0.0133 0.0027***
0.1678 0.0096 0.0100 0.0117 0.0007
DIFFTIMING 0.0376*** 0.0060*** 0.0097*** 0.0038*** 0.0125***
0.0089 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0012
CONSTANT -0.1246 0.2877*** 0.5176*** 0.3326*** 0.6658***
1.7813 0.0510 0.0542 0.0624 0.1053
N 1257 346 2022 108 2529 574 1300 1463
***: statistically significant at 1%; **: statistically significant at *5%; *: statistically significant at 10%
Coefficients for stock-level controls AVGMCAP and SDEVMCAP are not reported for convenience.
a: stocks which were covered in post-merger period by analyst who worked at bidder firm before merger
b: stocks which were covered in post-merger period by analyst who worked at target firm before merger
c: There were not enough stocks with RIVALSTAY= 1 to obtain reliable estimates for this regression.
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we restrict attention to the stocks which were forecast by both bidder and target
rms during at least two quarters before the merger, and for which both analysts
were retained in the merged rm. In Table 10, we consider the regression
∆MSEi,j = α+ γ ·NEGCORi + errori,j (11)
where NEGCORi is a dummy variable that is equal to one if ρi < 0. The discussion
in section 2 suggests that the coefcient on NEGCOR should be negative. This is
because a negative correlation will lead to larger forecast improvements, and more
negative values for ∆MSEi,j. From the bottom of Table 10, we see that the number
of stocks when NEGCORi=1 is a small fraction of the sample, so that we pooled
both the bidder and target stocks observations to run the regression.19
The results show that the coefcient on NEGCOR is positive and signicant for
Mergers A,B,C, which rejects the strong implication of information pooling which
we are testing. This may not be surprising because the results in section 2 were
derived from a very stylized modeling framework.
5 Analyst selection
As shown earlier, all four mergers led to a great deal of employment turnover. The
possibility therefore arises that forecasting improvements can also be due to analyst
selection. As we explained in Section 2 above, analyst turnover following a merger
can lead to two types of analyst selection. First, if the analysts who remained were
systematically better than those who left, a brokerage-level improvement might re-
sult. Second, after a merger, the better of the bidder and target analyst can be chosen
to forecast a given stock. In both of these cases, the forecast improvement would
not be due to information pooling.
While information pooling and analyst selection can be observationally very
similar, our data permit us to look for direct evidence of analyst selection by ex-
amining patterns in analyst retention and the post-merger assignment of analysts to
stocks in our data. We examine the two types of analyst selection in turn.
1. Analyst selection in retention We start with the rst type of analyst selection,
and examine whether the better-abilitied analysts were retained in the merged rm,
after the merger. Table 11 compares the pre-merger MSEs of the forecast errors,
for the analysts who were retained following the mergers, and those who were not
retained. The top of Table 11 shows that the difference in the median pre-merger
MSE between the retained and non-retained analysts is insignicant across three
19The brokerage-level covariates AVGMCAP and STDMCAP are also included in the regressions,
but the coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity.
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Table 10: Regressions of Change in Mean Squared Error of Forecast on Pre-Merger
Correlation
Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder)
NEGCOR 58.0008*** 12.5190 7.9645*** -0.1487
7.6633 11.6276 1.1970 3.9765
DIFFTIMING -0.0447 0.2972*** -0.0105 -0.0005
0.0817 0.1169 0.0099 0.0343
CONSTANT 4.1991 -11.9197 -1.5000 -1.3910
5.4377 10.2791 0.6856 1.6906
#(NEGCOR=1) 2 3 2 12
med(ρi) 0.511 0.398 0.500 0.513
N 24 14 25 76
These regressions also included the stock-level controls AVGMCAP and STDMCAP.
***: statistically significant at 1%
**: statistically significant at 5%
*: statistically significant at 10%
a: stocks which were covered in post-merger period by analyst who worked at bidder firm before
merger
b: stocks which were covered in post-merger period by analyst who worked at target firm before
merger
c: There were not enough target stock observations with NEGCOR= 1 to permit estimation of this
regression
of the mergers. However, the difference is negative and signicant for Merger C
(-0.1312) which is evidence of analyst selection.
Once we break down the numbers among the bidder and target rms, the ev-
idence for analyst selection becomes even more mixed. For bidder analysts, the
median MSE amongst retained analysts is less than that of non-retained analysts
across all four mergers, which is evidence of positive selection. However, this dif-
ference is signicant only in Mergers A and C. For example, for the bidder analysts
in Merger C, the median MSE for the non-retained analysts is 0.3074, but lower
(0.0309) for the retained analysts. For the target analysts, the selection is gener-
ally in the adverse direction, with the median MSE of retained analysts higher than
that of non-retained analysts in three of the four mergers (except Merger C). Only
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Table 11: Are retained analysts adversely or positively selected?
Pre-Merger MSE Among Retained and Non-retained Analysts
Statusa Employerb Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
Retained Both Med. MSE 0.0387 0.0173 0.0354 0.0550
N c 40 60 110 100
Not Retained Both Med. MSE 0.0538 0.0294 0.1666 0.0658
N 47 24 93 48
∆ Med MSE Both -0.0151 -0.0121 -0.1312** -0.0108
Retained Bidder Med. MSE 0.0366 0.0100 0.0309 0.0410
N d 31 55 93 61
Not Retained Bidder Med. MSE 0.0898 0.0144 0.3074 0.0774
N 8 8 31 22
∆ Med MSE Bidder -0.0532** -0.0044 -0.2765* -0.0364
Retained Target Med. MSE 0.1770 0.1222 0.1409 0.0742
N 9 5 17 39
Not Retained Target Med. MSE 0.0307 0.0335 0.1586 0.0621
N 39 34 62 26
∆ Med MSE Target 0.1463 0.0887* -0.0177 0.0121
***: significant at1%
**: significant at 5%
*: significant at 10%
aWas analyst retained or not retained, in merged brokerage?
bAnalyst’s pre-merger employer (either bidder or target firm)
cThe total number of analysts in each column may be fewer than the number of pre-merger
analysts given in Table 2, because in this table, we eliminate analysts who do not provide at least
four quarterly forecasts for a given stock.
dThe total number of analysts in each column may be fewer than the number of pre-merger
analysts given in Table 2, because in this table, we eliminate analysts who do not provide at least
four quarterly forecasts for a given stock.
in Merger B, where the median MSE for retained analysts is 0.1222 and for non-
retained analysts is 0.0335, is the difference signicant.
2. Analyst selection in post-merger stock assignment To examine the second
type of analyst selection, arising if the better of the bidder and the target analyst
might be chosen to forecast a given stock, we restrict our attention to the subset
of the affected stocks which were (i) forecast by either the bidder or target rm
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Table 12: Determinants of post-merger stock assignment
Sample is restricted to affected stocks which were (i) forecast by either the bidder or target
firm analyst, after the merger; and (ii) both the bidder and target analysts were retained in
the merged brokerage.
Merger Merger Merger Merger
A B C D
Total N 23 20 27 73
of which:
(A): #(analyst w/lower stock MSE chosen): 14 9 14 27**
(B): #(analyst w/lower overall MSE chosen): 20*** 18*** 20** 35
(C): #(analyst w/longer tenure chosen): 2*** 14* 7** 40
(D): #(analyst from bidder brokerage chosen): 1*** 19*** 24*** 27**
Stars denote significance of a test for whether the probability is equal to 1
2
, with 3/2/1 stars
denoting a p-value below 1/5/10% under the null hypothesis that p = 1
2
. The t-test statistic
is pˆN−
1
2q
1
N
1
2
2
, where pˆN denote the fraction of stocks which satisfy each criterion.
Asymptotically, this statistic is distributed standard normal under the null that p = 1
2
.
analyst, after the merger; and for which (ii) both the bidder and target analysts
were retained in the merged brokerage. In Table 12, we investigate whether stocks
were systematically assigned to analysts with better abilities, based on pre-merger
forecasting performance.
In row (A), we consider whether the stock was assigned to the analyst who was
better at forecasting this particular stock before the merger. We nd no evidence
of this. For Mergers A, B, and C, we could not reject that the stock was assigned
randomly. For Merger D, our evidence indicates that the stock is more likely to be
assigned to the analyst who was worse at forecasting this particular stock before the
merger.
However, row (B) provides a partial explanation of this. Here, we consider
whether the stock was assigned to the analyst with better overall performance
(across all stocks that he/she forecast) before the merger. We nd strong evidence
in favor of this hypothesis. For Mergers A, B, and C, the overwhelming majority of
stocks are assigned to the analyst with the better overall pre-merger performance,
strong evidence of analyst selection in stock assignment. Only for Merger D do we
nd no evidence of this type of analyst selection.
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Table 13: Determinants of post-merger assignment of analysts to stocks
Results from probit regressions where left-hand side variable is
1(analyst j assigned to stock i after merger).
Sample is restricted to affected stocks which were (i) forecast by either the bidder
or target rm analyst, after the merger; and (ii) both the bidder and target analysts
were retained in the merged brokerage.
Each observation is a (stock i, analyst j).
Merger A Merger B Merger C Merger D
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Stder) (Stder) (Stder) (Stder)
STOCK BESTij a -1.0690 -0.3063 -0.0973
0.8992 0.4279 0.2234
OVERALL BESTj 1.7817*** 1.1130*** 0.5783**
0.8432 0.4092 0.2365
TENUREj 0.5309 -0.4728 -0.1592
0.6643 0.2983 0.0986
BIDDERj 2.4935** 0.9021* -1.0958***
1.0261 0.5158 0.2323
Constant -2.9731* -0.2274 0.4729*
1.6782 0.8540 0.2888
N 46 63 170
a: could not estimate due to collinearity of the regressors.
These ndings are echoed in Table 13, which contains results from probit re-
gressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether an analyst j is
assigned to cover stock i after the merger. As right-hand side variables, we in-
cluded the two indicators of pre-merger forecasting superiority used in Table 12
(STOCK BEST and OVERALL BEST), as well as two additional analyst-level
controls which likely inuence stock assignment after the merger. These two con-
trols are TENURE, measured as the number of years than the analyst was employed
before the mergers, and BIDDER, an indicator for whether the analyst worked at
the bidder rm before the merger. The one consistent result across the three mergers
for which we were able to run the regression is the positive and signicant coef-
cient on OVERALL BEST, an indicator for whether analyst j had the better overall
forecasting performance before the merger. The signs and magnitudes for the other
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variables varied across the mergers.
Summing up, our analysis of turnover and coverage patterns in this section
yields no evidence for the rst type of analyst selection, that better analysts are
more likely to be retained in the merged brokerage following the merger. This con-
rms anecdotal evidence that in the wake of job uncertainty due to the mergers,
many of the best analysts at the merging rms were poached away by competing
brokerages, so that the analysts remaining at the merged brokerage following the
merger are not the best analysts working at the two brokerages before the merger.
However, in the cases where both of a stock’s pre-merger analysts were retained in
the merged brokerage, we nd strong evidence (for three of the four mergers), that
the stock is likely to be assigned after the merger to the analyst with the better over-
all pre-merger forecasting performance. This suggests that analyst selection can be
a mechanism generating the post-merger forecasting improvements.
6 Conclusions
We exploit four large mergers of brokerage rms in the last decade to examine
whether the patterns of changes in forecasting accuracy following the mergers can
be attributed to information pooling. Given the large differences between the bro-
kerages involved in the mergers, and the motives for the merger, it is not surprising
that our results varied across mergers. However, several conclusions can be drawn.
First, at the brokerage-level, we nd some evidence of information pooling across
two of the four mergers (Mergers C and D), in that forecast improvements were
larger in the subsample of stocks which were covered by both of the merging bro-
kerages before the merger, and the subsample where both of the pre-merger analysts
were retained in the merged brokerage. These are indeed situations where informa-
tion pooling should be strongest. Furthermore, the merging brokerages in these
two mergers were of roughly equal forecasting ability before the mergers, which
perhaps made information pooling more likely.
Second, at the analyst-level, we nd no general evidence of forecast improve-
ments, except for Merger D. For this merger we found that the post-merger fore-
casts of analysts from the target rm benet more from the presence of the analyst
who covered the same stock at the bidder rm around than vice versa. We also
nd evidence that after a merger, a stock is more likely to be assigned to an ana-
lyst with overall better forecasting performance before the merger. This suggests
that analyst selection can be a mechanism generating the post-merger forecasting
improvements.
Finally, the results for Merger D yield the strongest evidence consistent with
information pooling. Only for this merger do we nd evidence consistent with
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information pooling in both the brokerage-level regressions and the analyst-level
regressions (for the target stocks only). Moreover, only for this merger do we nd
no evidence of analyst selection. This nding of information pooling after Merger
D also corroborates to some extent the coverage of this merger in the business press.
Particularly, the general perception is that the analysts from Paine Webber (the tar-
get brokerage) were absorbed into the merged brokerage without much problem (cf.
Crain Communications, Inc. (2000)). Perhaps this post-merger collegiality between
the Paine Webber and UBS analysts explains the evidence of information pooling
that we found for this merger.
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